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We show that given any ﬁnite Bayesian game with a commonly-known common prior proba-
bility distribution, its set of cursed equilibria coincides a set of Bayesian Nash equilibria of an
augmented game where players perceive other players types as if they are partially aware of
others’ original information structures. Consistent with the intuition that cursedness implies
scarce computational resource, partial awareness is equivalent to a reduction of the complexity
of players’ strategic computation. This result also shows the potential of using unawareness
to formulate imperfect strategic sophistication.1 Introduction
In a game with incomplete information, if players have correct beliefs about other players’
information and expect others rationally choose actions depending on their information, then
the proper equilibrium concept is the standard Bayesian Nash equilibria. But when players
are not sophisticated, one common mistake is to take other players’ actions as unrelated
with their private information. In reality, the way agents make decisions often lies between
the two extremes. By a χ-weighted combination of the two situations, Eyster and Rabin
(2005) introduce the concept of cursed equilibria to explain ﬁeld or experimental data and do
statistical inferences.
However, the notion of Bayesian Nash equilibrium itself is legitimate even when players
have wrong (incompatible with the reality) or inconsistent (unable to be derived from a
common prior) beliefs1. A large proportion of the economic literature assumes that prior
beliefs must be common knowledge, so that there is no event that some players know could
happen while some don’t. However, sometimes we might need to relax this assumption to
make the Bayesian Nash framework more ﬂexible. In this paper, we want to show that by
properly choosing more general beliefs, a cursed equilibrium can be justiﬁed as a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium in a more general sense.
The equivalence is not obvious whenever the weight of cursedness χ is positive. In the
proof of the existence of cursed equilibria, Eyster and Rabin (2005) let every player have two
possible payoﬀs at every state. With probability 1−χ, it depends on others’ types, and with
probability χ, it does not. In this virtual game, the Bayesian Nash equilibrium is a cursed
equilibrium of the original game. Such formulation shows the existence of cursed equilibria
but is not a very good justiﬁcation within a Bayesian Nash framework, because it is diﬃcult
to argue that players’ payoﬀ functions are so versatile.
Using the idea of partial awareness, we want to justify cursed equilibrium within a Bayesian
Nash framework . To see the intuition of awareness, suppose that a player’s type is a state
of mind determined by his information. In many realistic situations, the processing of the
1See Myerson (2004) for a discussion and Mertens and Zamir (1985) for a formal model.
1information is not perfect. This information can be a multidimensional signal and the player,
as a receiver of the signal, may lack the ability to either perceive, or measure, or understand the
variations in certain dimensions. Li (2006) considers a model in which the player is “aware”
of and actually uses only some dimensions of the signal. Taking a diﬀerent analogy, Heifetz
et al. (2006) say that all information is expressed in some language and to express complex
information, a language must be rich in its expressive power. For example, a language with a
restricted vocabulary in general has less expressive power. In this sense, they deﬁne a player’s
awareness by the expressive power of the language that he uses.
Heifetz et al. (2007) provide a general framework formulating unawareness in games with
incomplete information. In this paper, we focus on a speciﬁc situation that players may be
partially aware of others’ types, in the sense that the perceived types can be represented by
a partition and the original types can be represented by another however ﬁner partition, on
the same set of states.
It is not very surprising that partial awareness can explain some imperfect strategic be-
haviors. What we show is that under certain assumptions the equilibria derived from partially
aware types are exactly equivalent to the cursed equilibria.
It takes two steps to show the result. First we modify every player’s types. While keeping
every type’s belief about the exogenous parameter, we let this type perceive an augmented set
of other players’ types by adding a state where all other players do not have any information.
By assuming that the type believes others to play an averaged strategy at this additional state,
we can show that a Bayesian Nash equilibrium is exactly a cursed equilibrium. Second we show
that the augmented set of types imply that the perceived information structure is always worse
than the original information structure in the sense of Blackwell condition. Therefore using the
result of Green and Stokey (1978), we can show that both the perceived information structure
and the original information structure can be represented by two partitions of the same
set of states with the same probability measure, and the partition representing the original
information structure reﬁnes the other. This matches our deﬁnition of partial awareness.
A closely related work is Miettinen (2007). There he ﬁrst deﬁnes the original set of states
2as a partition of an interval of measure one. Then he deﬁnes new partition of the interval.
With the new partition, at every original state, he allows every player to be able to understand
other players’ type-dependent strategies with probability 1 − χ, and not able to do so with
probability χ. Therefore at every original state, the expected payoﬀ function is just like the
one in the virtual game in Eyster and Rabin (2005). He uses this idea and the concept of
analogy based expectation equilibrium to provide a learning foundation of cursed equilibrium.
Roughly speaking, the analogy based expectation equilibrium allows players to partition
other players’ types and assume the strategies to be based on the members of the partition
instead of those types. Since partial awareness can be considered as one possible reason for
players to partition in a certain way, two ideas are quite similar. However, since the new
partition in Miettinen (2007) has more members than the number of original states, he con-
cludes that when players are partially (but not fully) cursed, they use more complex strategic
computations. But in our framework, the partition representing the perceived information
structure is always coarser than the one representing the original information structure, hence
the implication is the opposite.
The paper is organized as follows. We set up the framework and review Bayesian Nash
Equilibrium and cursed equilibrium in Section 2. A justiﬁcation with expanded type spaces
is shown in Section 3. We show the main result on partial awareness in Section 4. During the
process, an example about a lemon market is demonstrated. In Section 5, we discuss a lemon
market model with partial awareness without referring to cursed equilibrium. Conclusions
are in Section 6.
2 Bayesian Nash equilibria and cursed equilibria
The game is a ﬁnite static game with incomplete information denoted by


Θ,Ti; q;Ai;ui
N
i=1.
The set of players is {1,2,...,N}. The exogenous parameter is θ ∈ Θ. The space of player
types is T ≡ ×N
i=1Ti. A common prior probability distribution q puts positive measure on
every state in Θ × T. Type ti’s belief on the parameter and other players’ types (θ,t−i) is
given by q(θ,t−i|ti).
3An action of Player i is ai ∈ Ai, and Ai is the action set. All players’ action proﬁle is
a vector a ∈ A ≡ ×N
i=1Ai. The action proﬁle space A is assumed to be ﬁxed for all states.
Player i’s payoﬀ function is ui : A × Θ → R. It is also assumed that this information is
common knowledge.
A mixed strategy σi for Player i speciﬁes a probability distribution over actions for each
type, σi : Ti → ∆(Ai). Let σi(ai|ti) be the probability that type ti plays action ai. A strategy
proﬁle is σ(t) ≡ ×N
i=1σi(ti) : T → ∆(A). Let A−i be the set of action proﬁles for players other
than i, σ−i be the strategy proﬁle of players other than i, and σ−i(a−i|t−i) be the probability
that types t−i ∈ T−i plays actions a−i under strategy σ−i(t−i).
We review the deﬁnitions of Bayesian Nash equilibrium (Harsanyi, 1967-1968) and cursed
equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 1. A strategy proﬁle σ is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium if for each Player i =
1,...,N, each type ti ∈ Ti, and each a∗
i such that σi(a∗
i|ti) > 0,
a∗
i ∈ arg max
ai∈Ai
X
θ∈Θ
X
t−i∈T−i
q(θ,t−i|ti) ×
X
a−i∈A−i
σ−i(a−i|t−i)ui(ai,a−i;θ). (1)
In a cursed equilibrium (Eyster and Rabin, 2005), given other players’ strategy σ−i, Player
i mistakenly believes that with probability χ ∈ [0,1] other players play mixed strategies
regardless their types, and these strategies average their true strategies over their types,
which is
¯ σ−i(a−i|ti) ≡
X
t−i∈T−i
X
θ∈Θ
q(θ,t−i|ti)σ−i(a−i|t−i). (2)
Deﬁnition 2. A strategy proﬁle σ is a χ-cursed equilibrium if for each Player i, each type
ti ∈ Ti, and each a∗
i such that σi(a∗
i|θi) > 0,
a∗
i ∈ arg max
ai∈Ai
X
θ∈Θ
X
t−i∈T−i
q(θ,t−i|ti) ×
X
a−i∈A−i

χ¯ σ−i(a−i|ti) + (1 − χ)σ−i(a−i|t−i)

×ui(ai,a−i;θ). (3)
4When χ = 0, χ-cursed equilibrium coincides with Bayesian Nash equilibrium. When
χ = 1, every player assumes that other players’ strategy is completely unrelated with their
types, namely players are fully cursed.
2.1 Lemon market: part 1
Consider the following example, taken from Eyster and Rabin (2005). There is a used car,
a seller and a buyer. The exogenous parameter v ∈ {vh,vl} determines the car’s value. At
state vh, the value to the seller is 2,000, the value to the buyer is 3,000; at state vl, the value
to both is 0.
Ex ante, each state happens with probability 1
2. Suppose the seller has a perfect signal
s ∈ {g,b} so that Pr(v = vh|s = g) = Pr(v = vl|s = b) = 1. The buyer has no information
besides the prior probability distribution.
Then at a ﬁxed price P, both sides are able to choose “deal” or “no deal”. Trade happens
only if both choose “deal”.
Let P = 1,000. The seller sells only when s = b, and the buyer who knows this chooses
“no deal”. In the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium, no trade happens.
In the cursed equilibrium, a χ-cursed buyer believes that with probability χ the seller sells
with probability 1
2 irrespective of the signal, the car’s expected value is 3000[(1−χ)0+χ1
2] =
1500χ. Hence, a buyer cursed with χ > 2
3 will buy. Also, the seller’s strategy, selling whenever
s = b, after being averaged over his types, is consistent with the buyer’s belief.
3 An intermediate alternative justiﬁcation
We let players to have types diﬀerent from T. There will be a type yi ∈ Yi corresponding to
every type ti, so that yi shares ti’s belief on the parameter, but he believes that there is a
state with positive probability that none of other players have information.
To formalize, we need, for every Player i, one set of types: (Yi,pi) and N −1 sets of types:
(Y i
j ,pi
j),∀j 6= i,j ∈ {1,...,N}. We deﬁne the relation among the type sets by two bijective
mappings: fi : Yi → Ti and fi
j : Y i
j \yi
jx → Tj, where yi
jx denotes a special type related to
5the cursedness. Here Yi is the set of new types of Player i, with exactly the same number of
elements of set Ti, or |Yi| = |Ti|. Not knowing that the types of Player j are in Yj, Player i
believes that Y i
j is the set of types of Player j, and |Y i
j | = |Tj| + 1.
The following assumptions are made regarding Player i’s prior belief pi.
1) The marginal probability distributions of pi about yi is equal to that of q about fi(yi).
X
θ∈Θ
X
yi
−i∈Y i
j
pi(θ,yi,yi
−i) =
X
θ∈Θ
X
t−i∈T−i
q(θ,fi(yi),t−i); (4)
2) The conditional probability distribution of pi on (θ,yi
−i) given yi is
pi(θ,yi
−i|yi) =

    
    
(1 − χ)q(θ,fi
−i(yi
−i)|fi(yi)) if yi
−i ∈ ×j6=i(Y i
j \yi
jx),
χ
P
t−i q(θ,t−i|fi(yi)) if yi
−i = yi
−ix,
0 otherwise.
(5)
Note that the second condition implies that Player i believes that either all other agents are
cursed or none is cursed.
Player i also believes that j’s belief pi
j puts a positive measure on every state in Θ×T−j×Y i
j :
2
X
θ∈Θ
X
t−j∈T−j
pi
j(θ,t−j,yi
j) =

 
 
χ if yi
j = yi
jx,
(1 − χ)
P
θ∈Θ
P
t−j∈T−j q(θ,t−j,fi
j(yi
j)) if yi
j 6= yi
jx.
(6)
And the conditional probability distribution of pi on (θ,t−j) given yi
j is
pi
j(θ,t−j|yi
j) =

 
 
P
tj∈Tj q(θ,tj,t−i) if yi
j = yi
jx,
q(θ,t−j|fi
j(yi
j)) if yi
j ∈ Y i
j \yi
jx.
(7)
2Actually, this only matters in the next section, because to verify if a strategy proﬁle is Bayesian Nash
equilibria, only beliefs {pi}
N
i=1 matters. We emphasize that with inconsistent beliefs it is generally not true
that players could reason that others are rational. It is because players view others’ information in a way that
is inconsistent with what others believe.
6For Player i, denote the strategy of other players by a function of the perceived types of
others, namely σ0
−i : Y i
−i → ∆(A−i). We assume that when the state yi
−ix happens, Player i
believes that other players play averaged strategies.
Assumption 1. For every Player i, every type yi believes that given type proﬁle yi
−ix, all
other players play the strategy
¯ σ0
−i(a−i|yi) =
1
1 − Prob{yi
−i = yi
−ix|yi}
X
θ∈Θ
X
yi
−i∈Y i
−i\yi
−ix
pi(θ,yi
−i|yi)σ0
−i(a−i|yi
−i).
Lemma 1. With Assumption 1 hold, the augmented game’s set of Bayesian Nash equilibria
coincides the set of cursed equilibria of the original game.
Proof. First by Equation 5, for every yi,
Prob{˜ yi
−i = yi
−ix|˜ yi = yi} =
X
θ∈Θ
pi(θ,yi
−ix|yi) =
X
θ∈Θ
χ
X
t−i
q(θ,t−i|fi(ti)) = χ.
Then by this and Equation 5, Assumption 1 implies that
¯ σ0
−i(a−i|yi) =
X
θ∈Θ
X
yi
−i∈Y i
−i\yi
jx
q(θ,fi
j(yi
−i)|fi(yi))σ0
−i(a−i|yi
−i). (8)
Second by Deﬁnition 1, in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium σ00 : ×N
i=1Yi → ∆(A)3, for each
Player i = 1,...,N, each type yi ∈ Yi, and each a∗
i such that σ00
i (a∗
i|yi) > 0,
a∗
i ∈ arg max
ai∈Ai
X
θ∈Θ
pi(θ,yi
−ix|yi)
X
a−i∈A−i
σ0
−i(a−i|yi
−ix)ui(a;θ) +
X
θ∈Θ
X
yi
−i∈Y i
−i\yi
−ix
pi(θ,yi
−i|yi) ×
X
a−i∈A−i
σ0
−i(a−i|yi
−i)ui(a;θ).
3Note that player j’s true strategy σ
00
j (·|yj) is equivalent to σ
0
j(·|y
i
j) when fj(yj) = f
i
j(y
i
j).
7The two components in the objective function are, ﬁrst by Assumption 1 and Equation 5,
X
θ∈Θ
pi(θ,yi
−ix|yi)
X
a−i∈A−i
σ0
−i(a−i|yi
−ix)ui(a;θ) =
X
θ∈Θ
X
t−i∈T−i
χq(θ,t−i|fi(yi))
X
a−i∈A−i
¯ σ0
−i(a−i|yi)ui(a;θ),
and secondly
X
θ∈Θ
X
yi
−i∈Y i
−i\yi
−ix
pi(θ,yi
−i|yi) ×
X
a−i∈A−i
σ0
−i(a−i|yi
−i)ui(a;θ) =
X
θ∈Θ
X
yi
−i∈Y i
−i\yi
−ix
(1 − χ)q(θ,fi
−i(yi
−i)|fi(yi)) ×
X
a−i∈A−i
σ0
−i(a−i|yi
−i)ui(a;θ).
Hence the objective function is equivalent to
X
θ∈Θ
X
yi
−i∈Y i
−i\yi
−ix
q(θ,fi
−i(yi
−i)|fi(yi)) ×
X
a−i∈A−i

χ¯ σ0
−i(a−i|yi) +
(1 − χ)σ0
−i(a−i|yi
−i)

× ui(a;θ).
Compare it with the objective function in Deﬁnition 3, and in particular, compare Equa-
tion 8 and Equation 2. We see that the characterizations of cursed equilibrium and Bayesian
Nash equilibrium are equivalent. The sets of two must be identical. QED.
3.1 Lemon market: part 2
Let the buyer believe that there is a new signal s0 ∈ {x,g,b} with prior probability Pr(s0 =
x) = χ,Pr(s0 = g) = 1
2(1 − χ),Pr(s0 = b) = 1
2(1 − χ). The buyer believes that when the
signal is g or b, it again conveys perfect information. But when it is x, the seller knows no
information. This is
Pr(v = vh|s0 = g) = Pr(v = vl|s0 = b) = 1,
Pr(v = vh|s0 = x) = Pr(v = vl|s0 = x) =
1
2
.
8Thus the buyer believes that the seller’s expected value is 3000 at s0 = g, 1000 at s0 = x,
and 0 at s0 = b. The buyer expects that if the seller sells, the signal s0 ∈ {x,b}; if the seller
sells with .5 probability at s0 = x, then the car’s expected value conditional on a deal is
3000
Pr(v = vh,s0 = x)0.5 + Pr(v = vh,s0 = b)
0.5Pr(s0 = x) + Pr(s0 = b)
=
3000χ.52
0.5(1 − χ) + .5χ
= 1500χ.
The buyer buys if 1500χ > 1000, or χ ≥ 2
3, which is equivalent to the result in the ﬁrst part
of the example.
4 Partial awareness
The previous justiﬁcation relies on adding artiﬁcial states. From the viewpoint of a modeler,
there could be some cognitive reason for the deviation of the perception of players. We want to
apply the idea of awareness on the relation between the perceived types and the original types.
It requires taking the two sets of types as players’ information structures and representing
them by information partitions on the same set of states with the same prior belief. We show
that the relation between the partitions matches the deﬁnition of partial awareness, therefore
by Lemma 1 the main result follows.
We ﬁrst explain what we mean by an information partition that represents a player’s
information structure. Generally speaking, consider a decision maker uncertain about the
value of parameter φ ∈ Φ, where Φ = {φ1,...,φK} is a ﬁnite set. Let the prior probability
distribution be r = {r1,...,rK}.
An information structure has two alternative formalizations.
1. A set of types Y , and a prior probability distribution λ on Φ × Y . This is denoted by
(Y,λ).
2. A set X, a probability distribution µ on Φ × X, and a partition P on X. This is
denoted by (X,µ,P).
9Deﬁnition 3. We say that (X,µ,P) represents (Y,λ) if there is a mapping:
τ : P → Y
such that
1) for each y ∈ Y , each s ∈ τ−1(y), and all φ ∈ Φ,
µ({φ} × s)
µ(Φ × s)
= λ(φ|y),
2) for each y ∈ Y ,
X
s∈τ−1(y)
µ(Φ × s) = λ(Φ,y).
Now we deﬁne partial awareness.
Deﬁnition 4. Player i is partially aware of Player j’s original information structure if for
all of his types, there is a set Xj, a probability measure µj on Θ × Xj, and two partitions of
Xj: Pj and P0
j, such that
1) The information structure (Xj,µj,Pj) represents player j’s original information struc-
ture (Tj,q);
2) The information structure (Xj,µj,P0
j) represents player j’s information structure that
i perceives, or (Y i
j ,pi
j);
3) Pj is a reﬁnement of P0
j.
Before we show the main result, the following deﬁnition and theorem are useful. Let (Y,q)
and (Y 0,q0) be two information structures about the value of same φ ∈ Φ ≡ {φ1,...,φK},
with Y = {y1,...,yL} and Y 0 = {y0
1,...,y0
H}. Denote the conditional probability distribution
q(y|φk), k ∈ {1,...,K}, by a row vector πk. Denote the conditional probability distribution
q0(y0|φk) by a row vector π0
k.
Deﬁnition 5. Two information structures (Y,q) and (Y 0,q0) satisfy Blackwell’s condition if
10and only if there exists a Markov matrix B such that
Π0 = ΠB, (9)
where Π = (πk(yl)), l ∈ {1,...,L} and Π0 = (π0
k(y0
h)), h ∈ {1,...,H}.
Theorem 1. Green and Stokey (1978) If two information structures (Y,q) and (Y 0,q0) satisfy
Blackwell’s condition 9, then there exists (X,µ,P,P0) such that
1. (X,µ,P) represents (Y,q);
2. (X,µ,P0) represents (Y 0,q0);
3. P reﬁnes P0.
The proof of the theorem is mainly about how to construct the elements (X,µ,P,P0). We
will show that in the following subsection. But ﬁrst we can present the following result.
Proposition 1. Given that Player j’s original types are (Tj,q) and Player i believes that
Player j’s types are (Y i
j ,pi
j), Player i is partially aware of Player j’s original information
structure.
Proof. 1. Conditional on every ω ∈ Θ × T−j, Player j’s original type tj’s probability
distribution is q(tj|ω). Let the set Tj be indexed by m ∈ {1,...,|Tj|} and the set Θ × T−j
be indexed by n ∈ {1,...,|Θ × T−j|}. We deﬁne a matrix Πj such that an element πnm =
q(tjm|ωn).
2. Conditional on every ω ∈ Θ × T−j, by Conditions 6 and 7, the probability of type yi
j
given ω is
pi
j(yi
j|ω) =

 
 
χ if yi
j = yi
jx,
(1 − χ)q(tj|ω) if yi
j 6= yi
jx, and fi
j(yi
j) = tj.
(10)
Let the set Y i
j be indexed by m0 ∈ {1,...,|Y i
j |}. Deﬁne a matrix Πi
j such that an element
π0
nm0 = pi
j(yi
jm0|ωn). Properly arrange the indexes we will have that
11Πi
j =

χI|Θ×T−j|×1, (1 − χ)Πj

.
Therefore there is a Markov matrix
B =

 
 
 


χ 1 − χ 0 ... 0
χ 0 1 − χ ... 0
. . .
. . .
. . .
...
. . .
χ 0 0 ... 1 − χ



 
 


,
such that Πi
j = ΠjB. Blackwell’s condition 9 is satisﬁed. By Theorem 1, the result follows.
QED.
Putting Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 together, we have the main result.
Theorem 2. For any χ ∈ (0,1], the set of cursed equilibria of a game coincides a set of
Bayesian Nash equilibria of an augmented game where players are partially aware of other
players’ original information structures.
Deﬁne the complexity of his strategic computation by the cardinality of the partitions of
other players perceived by Player i. Because partition Pj reﬁnes P0
j, when Player i perceives
P0
j rather than Pj, the complexity decreases.
Corollary 1. The complexity of players’ strategic computation decreases when the cursedness
χ becomes positive.
4.1 Constructing information partitions.
The construction uses the method of Green and Stokey (1978) shown in the proof of Theorem
1. For notational brevity, we omit the subscripts of (Xj,µj,Pj,P0
j). The set X = Tj × Y i
j .
The partitions P = {(tj,yi
j)|tj ∈ Tj,yi
j ∈ Y i
j } and P0 = {Tj × {yi
j}|yi
j ∈ Y i
j }. We see that P
reﬁnes P0.
The probability measure
µ
 
{(ω,x)}

= µ
 
{(ωn,tjm,yi
jm0)}

= q(ωn,tjm)bmm0.
12where bmm0 is the element of Markov matrix B.
Now we need to show that (X,µ,P) represents (Tj,q), i.e. they satisfy Deﬁnition 3. Take
τ((tj,yi
j)) = tj, so that τ−1(¯ tj) = {{(¯ tj,y0i
j )}|y0i
j ∈ Y i
j }. Then
µ(ωn,tjm,yi
jm0)
µ(Θ × T−j × (tjm,yi
jm0))
=
q(ωn,tjm)bmm0
P
n q(ωn,tjm)bmm0
= q(ωn|tjm).
This veriﬁes the ﬁrst condition in the deﬁnition.
Because
P
m0 bmm0 = 1 for every m,
X
w∈τ−1(tjm)
µ(Θ × T−j × w) =
X
n
X
m0
µ(ωn,tjm,yi
jm0)
=
X
n
X
m0
q(ωn,tjm)bmm0
= q(Θ × T−j,tjm).
The second condition in the deﬁnition is also veriﬁed.
To show that (X,µ,P0) represents (Y i
j ,pi
j), deﬁne τ((tj,yi
j)) = yi
j so that τ−1(¯ yi
j) =
Tj × {¯ yi
j}, then follow the same logic.
4.2 Lemon market: part 3
The probability distribution speciﬁed in part 2 implies that for the original types of the seller
we have
Π =



1 0
0 1


,
and Πvs = Pr(s|v), where v ∈ {vh,vl} is the row index and s ∈ {g,b} is the column index.
For the perceived types of the seller, we have
Π0 =



χ 1 − χ 0
χ 0 1 − χ


,
and π0
vs0 = Pr(s0|v), where v ∈ {vh,vl} is the row index and s0 ∈ {x,g,b} is the column index.
13The Markov matrix is B = Π0.
We construct a set X = {g,b}×{x,g,b} and partitions P and P0, where P = {{gg},{gx},{gb},
{bg},{bx},{bb}}, and P0 = {{gg,bg},{gx,bx},{gb,bb}}. It is easy to see that P reﬁnes P0.
The measure µ is given as
µ(v,s,s0) = Pr(v) × Πvs × Π0
ss0.
µ(v,s,s0) v = vh v = vl
s = g,s0 = x
χ
2 0
s = g,s0 = g
1−χ
2 0
s = g,s0 = b 0 0
s = b,s0 = x 0
χ
2
s = b,s0 = g 0 0
s = b,s0 = b 0
1−χ
2
Table 1: The probability distribution µ.
With a mapping τ({ss0}) = s, ∀s ∈ {g,b} and s0 ∈ {x,g,b}, we can check that (X,µ,P) is a
representation of s ∈ {g,b}. A similar check for (X,µ,P0) uses a mapping τ0({g,b}×{s0}) = s0,
∀s0 ∈ {x,g,b}.
5 An alternative lemon market model with partial awareness
To emphasize the idea we present this example in a reverse order. We deﬁne set X = {vh,vl}×
{g,b}×{g0,b0}, partition P = {{gg0},{gb0},{bg0},{bb0}}, the partition P0 = {{gg0,bg0},{gb0,bb0}}.
Hence P reﬁnes P0. Given q ∈ (1
2,1], the distribution µ is as
µ(v,s,s0) v = vh v = vl
s = g,s0 = g0 q
2 0
s = g,s0 = b0 1−q
2 0
s = b,s0 = g0 0
1−q
2
s = b,s0 = b0 0
q
2
Table 2: The probability distribution µ.
Thus if the buyer believes that the seller’s information is represented by partition P0,
he knows that the seller could essentially have two types s0 ∈ {g0,b0}. Deﬁne a mapping
14τ0 : P0 → {g0,b0} so that τ0({gg0,bg0}) = g0 and τ0({gb0,bb0}) = b0. It implies that
Pr(s0 = g0) =
X
v∈{vh,vl}
X
s∈{g,b}
µ(v,s,s0 = g0) =
1
2
;
Pr(s0 = b0) =
1
2
;
Pr(v = vh|s0 = g0) =
q
2
1
2
= q;
Pr(v = vl|s0 = b0) =
q
2
1
2
= q;
Believing this, the buyer expects that the seller never sells at type s0 = g0. But if s0 = b0,
he sells because 2000(1−q) ≤ 1000, the expected value of the car is 3000(1−q) to the buyer.
So if q < 2
3, he wants to buy in equilibrium. It is just like in a cursed equilibrium.
But the original types are given by partition P.
Deﬁne a mapping τ : P → {g,b} so that τ({ss0}) = s. It implies that for every s00 ∈ τ−1(s),
Pr(s00 = gg0) =
X
v∈{vh,vl}
µ(v,s = g,s0 = g0) =
q
2
;
Pr(s00 = gb0) =
X
v∈{vh,vl}
µ(v,s = g,s0 = b0) =
1 − q
2
;
Pr(s00 = bg0) =
X
v∈{vh,vl}
µ(v,s = b,s0 = g0) =
1 − q
2
;
Pr(s00 = bb0) =
X
v∈{vh,vl}
µ(v,s = b,s0 = b0) =
q
2
;
and
Pr(v = vh|s00 = gg0) = Pr(v = vh|s00 = gb0) = 1;
Pr(v = vl|s00 = bg0) = Pr(v = vl|s00 = bb0) = 1.
These imply that the seller has perfect information. And the buyer shall not trade in the
equilibrium.
15In addition, the true types induce
Π =



1 0
0 1


,
where π11 = Pr(s = g|v = vh), π12 = Pr(s = b|v = vh), π21 = Pr(s = g|v = vl), π22 =
Pr(s = b|v = vl).
And the perceived types induce
Π0 =



q 1 − q
1 − q q


,
where π0
11 = Pr(s0 = g|v = vh), π0
12 = Pr(s0 = b|v = vh), π0
21 = Pr(s0 = g|v = vl),
π0
22 = Pr(s0 = b|v = vl).
A Markov matrix B = Π0 satisﬁes Blackwell’s condition Π0 = ΠB. The probability measure
µ can be derived from Π and Π0.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we show the innovative cursed equilibrium concept is a special case of Bayesian
Nash equilibrium with partial awareness. It justiﬁes the ﬁrst concept and suggests that
the second concept is more general and may have potential to explain imperfect strategic
sophistication from the cognitive aspects. Further applications in auction and trading can be
promising.
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